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The process through which leaders are chosen in democratic societies has a
significant influence on the function of governance. Voters hold the prerogative of
electing their representatives and in doing so delegate to them the authority to make
important policy decisions on their behalf. “Thus,” Arend Lijphart noted, “the electoral
system is the most fundamental element of representative democracy.” (1994, p. 1) The
goal of this research paper is to determine if there are differences in voter and candidate
engagement between two types of local elections found in Santa Clara County: The
commonly used basic at-large (BAL) process and the more rare at-large by-seat (ALBS)
system. To the extent the ALBS system is found
Diagram 1
to be beneficial, it offers municipalities an
additional and perhaps compelling option for
elections reform.
The bulk of California municipalities elect
their city councils through a basic at-large system.
In the BAL process, candidates run citywide
without a seat or district designation. Residents
may cast votes up to the number of openings
being considered for election. Candidates equal
to the number of openings who receive the highest
number of votes are elected (see Diagram 1). (CSC, 2013b)
However, the cities of Santa Clara and Sunnyvale use a unique at-large by-seat
system. In the ALBS process, city council candidates stand for election citywide but run
for an individual “seat.” This seat does not reflect a geographic area or district, and can
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Diagram 2

be thought of as the “slot” for which a candidate
runs. The candidate who receives the highest
number of votes in the contest for each individual
seat is elected (see Diagram 2). (CSC, 2013a) To
date, these are the only two municipalities in the
state to use the ALBS system in a November
general municipal election process.
Proponents of both BAL and ALBS
elections contend that their favored process is
superior. They cite increased levels of voter and
candidate participation in their preferred system

as well as complexity or political barriers that decrease involvement in the system which
they oppose. However, to date there has been little study of the anecdotal and
quantifiable effects of either. This suggests two questions: Are there measureable
differences between the BAL and ALBS systems regarding voter and candidate
engagement? And, if so, how are the variations manifested in the public process?

WHY IT MATTERS
Voters, politicians and administrators all have a stake in the elections process.
Voters should be provided a system that will engage them and correctly reflect their
collective electoral decisions. Candidates should be afforded a format that is
approachable and allows them to be judged fairly and openly by the public. While
attention is rightly paid to the rapport between voters and candidates, it is important to
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recognize that the form and structure of the process play an influential role in the
eventual outcomes of elections. (Bowler, Donovan & Karp, 2006, p. 434) It is in this vein
that City Clerks and elections officials perform a vital function in administering the
process and serving as experts in the policy area. Fostering “neutral and impartial”
elections is a professional duty outlined in the International Institute of Municipal Clerks
Code of Ethics. (IIMC, 2012) The nature of the process may influence who seeks
election, the tenor of debate and how readily residents take part by voting. It is a core
belief of City Clerks that elections systems which allow greater involvement and more
informed electorates foster a stronger democracy.
The rules of an elections system are a representational conduit through which the
needs and social conditions of a community manifest themselves in the process of
governance. In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam states, “Government
institutions receive inputs from their social environment and produce outputs to respond
to that environment.” (p. 9) At the most basic level, voters provide inputs through those
they elect to public office. Lijphart has contended, “This indispensible task in
representative democracies is performed by the electoral system – the set of methods for
translating the citizens’ votes into representatives’ seats.” (1994, p. 1) It follows that the
manner in which both voters and candidates are engaged in an elections system is
important as a bridge between the will of people and their government.
There has been an historic downward trend in the United States regarding actual
voter turnout (Putnam, 2000, pp, 31 – 33) which has been called, “… an embarrassment
in a country whose core self-understanding rests on a commitment to democratic self
governance.” (Williams, 2005, p. 637) While there are varying opinions regarding the
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extent or causes of lower voter turnout in the US, it has been contended that an
explanation should focus on the institutional structure of political systems rather than the
motivations or behaviors of voters and candidates. (McDonald & Popkin, 2001, p. 970)
Representative democracy and the performance of its various structures and
institutions have been a topic of study for millennia. Theorists ranging from Aristotle to
Mill to Tocqueville have postulated the relative benefits and faults of various forms of
democratic governance. (Putnam, 1993, pp. 9 – 13) It has been noted that “democracy
occupies a privileged place” in the body politic in the United States. (Westheimer &
Kahne, 2004, p. 237) Overall, Americans are afforded the opportunities and freedom to
influence government which are on par or greater than most other democracies. This
includes the ability to express personal views through political activism, issues advocacy,
and directly campaigning for candidates. (Putnam, 2000, p. 31)
On a broad level, the study of American elections processes has been the subject
of significant institutional and academic attention. However, the bulk of these studies
have focused on higher profile federal and statewide contests. The prevalence of local
elections has been recognized; “ … in a federal system of over 80,000 governments, local
elections are both the most numerous and frequent type in American politics.” Also, that
the “overwhelming bulk” of the local elections in the United States are at-large contests.
(Lieske, 1989, pp. 150, 153) Despite this, the lack of academic attention in the area has
been lamented for decades. Lieske noted more than twenty years ago that the study of
local elections systems was, “… scant, limited, and largely relegated to the professional
sidelines ... .” (1989, p. 150) As recently as 2007, Oliver and Ha echoed this sentiment,
“Nowhere is this information gap greater than with respect to local elections. …
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Although these elections arguably represent the most immediate democratic experience
for a majority of Americans, political scientists have little understanding of what
determines voter choice in these settings.” (2007, p. 393)
While the study of local elections has been sparse, information regarding the
unique ALBS system is even more so, currently limited to anecdotal information and a
few staff reports. This is understandable, as the adoption of Santa Clara and Sunnyvale’s
ALBS systems were the result of local reform efforts to enhance the elections process and
not as academic exercises. The concept of home rule and political innovation have
shown the “… capacity of local governments to restructure basic features of their
political organizations, and their interest in doing so.” (Briffault, 2006, p. 3) While the
Briffault study focused on more recent events, it has generally been contended that direct
democracy such as the initiative process allows a more engaged electorate. (Tolbert,
McNeal & Smith, 2003, p. 24) Certainly, the electorate was directly involved in making
the ALBS policies through the creation of charter review committees, placing the
measures on the ballot, and considering the pros and cons when casting their ballots.
That said, it would be of value to assess if those changes in electoral policy led long-term
to a more engaged citizenry and have demonstrated the capacity to be an reform model
for other municipalities.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The authority for the BAL process is provided in the Government Code and is the
prescribed system for general law municipalities that rely on the State Constitution for
their operational rules. (State of California, 2012) It has also been adopted by many
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communities which have formulated and approved their own city charters. However,
charter cities have the additional latitude to enact different elections systems that may be
of benefit to the unique needs of their individual communities.
The charter changes necessary to adopt an ALBS system in the City of Santa
Clara and City of Sunnyvale were originally enabled by the early 1900s Progressive era
“direct democracy” movement. These efforts granted municipalities the “home rule”
autonomy to directly influence laws beyond, though not in conflict with, the State
Constitution. Through this the public were provided the benefit of the initiative,
referendum and recall processes. (Silva & Barbour, 1999, Pp. iii, 4; Gerston &
Christensen, 2012, pp. 5, 25 – 27)
In the mid 1960s, the City of Sunnyvale faced “… a conflict of interest scandal,
budget woes and a stalled downtown project,” in addition to the resignation of the City
Manager and a basic at-large City Council election fielding 22 candidates. Following a
tumultuous election cycle, the City Council convened a Citizens’ Charter Committee in
1967 to consider possible reforms to the City Charter. In November of that year, the
Committee proposed a change from the BAL system to an ALBS elections process,
which was placed on the June 1968 ballot as Proposition C. (CSV, 2006) The argument
in support of Proposition C stated, “The numbering of Council Seats will help insure that
Councilmen will be more responsive and responsible to the electorate. As a result of the
change the electorate will be able to give specific candidates more effective support.”
(CSV, 1968) The Charter amendment was approved by a 15,190 (76.33%) “Yes” and
4,708 (24.66%) “No” vote, changing the election of City Council members from a BAL
to an ALBS process. (County of Santa Clara, 1968)

6

The City of Santa Clara followed shortly thereafter and in 1971 constituted a
Charter Revision Advisory Committee to consider potential reforms and changes to its City
Charter. Among their recommendations, the Committee suggested a move from a BAL to
an ALBS elections system (Wise, 1972) which was placed on the November 1972 ballot as
Measure G. While there were no pro or con ballot arguments, information from the period
indicates the main reasons for proposing the change were the creation of greater
accountability among incumbents and enhanced voter engagement. In July of 1972 the San
Jose Mercury News wrote, “Numbering of the council seats would mean that a candidate
could challenge any incumbent directly by filing for his seat.” (Wise, 1972) In August of
the same year, the newspaper stated, “Another change numbers council seats, while not
changing the at-large election method. It makes possible a candidate zeroing in on one of
the incumbents by filing specifically for his seat.” (SJMN, 1972) Measure G was approved
by a 17,650 (65.66%) “Yes” and 9,229 (34.34%) “No” vote, adopting an ALBS system.
(CSC, 2000; CSC, 2006)
In an interview with Gary Gillmor, Mayor of Santa Clara from 1969 through 1977
during the change in election systems, he indicated that there were three main reasons for
the charter amendment adopting ALBS elections. The primary focus was accountability.
The ALBS system allowed a person to run against an incumbent or candidate based on
their track record without having to “run against the entire system” and the combined
strength of the field of candidates found in the BAL process. Another reason was to avoid
the common practice of “single-shot” or “bullet” voting, where people cast only one vote
for their most favored candidate rather than all of their allowed votes. If done in a BAL
system where multiple contests are considered collectively, this mathematically allows
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greater weight to a single vote and therefore stronger support for one candidate. It was
thought the separate contests in the ALBS system would eliminate the need to bullet-vote
and offer the public the ability to take part more fully in choosing more of their Council
Members. Additionally, it was also hoped that the multiple seat openings would engage
geographic areas outside of the City’s downtown neighborhood through the perception of
greater opportunity to seek office. (Gillmor, 2013)
While there are many benefits of the ALBS system, it has not been without
controversy. In 2009, supporters of the BAL process asked the City of Santa Clara’s
Ethics Committee to recommend that the City Council study a return to that election
system. (CSC, 2009a; CSC, 2009b) Their concern regarding the ALBS process had been
heightened by confusion in the 2008 election cycle, when a candidate rescinded his
nomination papers for one seat and filed in another just a few minutes prior to the closing
deadline. This left one candidate unexpectedly unopposed and multiple challengers
running in another seat. The City amended the policy to address the issue rather than
changing from the ALBS elections system. In previous years, candidates had been
allowed to pull nomination papers in multiple seats simultaneously, enabling the
jockeying evident in the 2008 filing process. The City changed this practice to allow
only one set of nomination papers to be pulled at a time. While candidates can rescind
their nomination documents for one seat and request a set for another, they cannot be
issued papers for multiple seats concurrently. Since the paperwork and gathering of
signatures necessary to file for a new seat is time-consuming, the policy curtailed lastminute gamesmanship and provided greater clarity in the nominations process. (CSC,
2009c)
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Additionally, while Santa Clara is an All-American Award-winning city, concerns
had been raised regarding the ethnic makeup if its City Council. The San Jose Mercury
News noted that the City Council lacks representation from emerging minority
communities. While the City has 37% Asian and 19% Latino residents, (Rodriguez,
2011) the Council is predominantly Caucasian. General concerns about potential barriers
to public service prompted the City Council in 2011 to create a formal Charter Review
Committee comprised of interested community members. While the Committee did not
suggest a change to district elections, they did recommend a switch from the ALBS to a
BAL system. (CSC, 2012a) The City Council accepted the report of the Committee
though did not act on the recommendation at the time, referring the topic to their Council
goal-setting process. (CSC, 2012b) However, a recent assessment of the election system’s
performance in the 2012 general municipal election was completed by Carolyn Schuk of
the Santa Clara WEEKLY. She indicated, “…the winners in Santa Clara’s city-wide seat
system were also the top vote getters overall. And analysis by precinct doesn’t change
that any. Santa Clara’s voting patterns are remarkably uniform across the city.” (Schuk,
2012)

REVIEW OF ELECTIONS SYSTEMS
Although there are numerous election types found on an international level, local
contests in California use a few main systems. Those which require a majority of votes
for a winner to be elected tend to use a primary and runoff elections process. In this,
candidates initially compete in a primary election. If a candidate does not reach a 50%
+1 vote majority, a runoff election is held. The primary and runoff elections are often
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consolidated with the state primary and general elections. More common, especially in
smaller municipalities is the plurality system. In this, one election is held in which the
highest vote-getter wins, regardless of if a majority reached. Some, mostly larger cities
in the state, are divided into geographical districts for the sake of electing representatives
from various regions of the municipality. However, the bulk of the city councils are
elected at-large, where the entire electorate is allowed to vote for a candidate for each
opening. Plurality, at-large processes are found in the cities used as benchmarks for the
comparison in this project.
While the BAL and ALBS systems are both elected at-large and citywide, they
differ in a number of ways. Practitioners, elections officials and participants have noticed
anecdotal distinctions regarding their influence on the political and governmental
process. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012) It is believed that the BAL system
fosters a more civil discourse while the ALBS process provides greater accountability.
With multiple candidates vying for office collectively in the BAL system, competitors
may be hesitant to be critical of each other even in cases where it is warranted. The
nature of hard-hitting debate between two candidates in a multiple person contest often
sheds votes to other viable contenders. In this case “viable” candidates are considered
those with some combination of the name identification, fundraising ability, volunteer
base, track record and other resources necessary to resonate with voters and win. While
this may create a more civil discourse, it may also stifle debate if contenders shy away
from warranted criticism of each other out of concern for losing votes to others in the
field. In the ALBS system it is more likely that two viable candidates will face each
other directly. This enables them to engage in a more vigorous discussion and campaign
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without the risk of shedding votes to other candidates. As such, the ALBS system may
provide the platform for a more robust debate and greater accountability, in both open
seats as well as with targeted incumbents. (CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012)
Once the election cycle is finished, the BAL and ALBS systems continue to
influence the manner in which politics manifests itself in the function of government. In
a BAL system, council members serve with former opponents once elected. They may be
less collegial due to ill feelings from the campaign process or less collaborative because
they view each other as competitors for reelection. This can cause political
gamesmanship and the desire to prove value above their peers in the eyes of voters. In
the ALBS system, council members have not been direct competitors, nor will they be for
reelection to their individual seats. This may foster greater civility and a willingness to
share information or support each other’s ideas on the basis of sound policy, with less
concern of the inter-council political ramifications. The possibility of running for
reelection unopposed in the ALBS system may also play a role in the nature of service on
the council. Council members may be more inclusive and responsive to community
needs if encouraged by the possibility of running for re-election either unopposed or
without mainstream opposition. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012)
Statistics regarding candidate and council member behavior are not readily
available to assess the validity of these subjective observations regarding the systems’
influences on politics and governance. However, voter turnout and candidacy data do
exist and can provide a base on which to consider if the systems differ as they relate to
voter engagement and candidate engagement.
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Voter Engagement: It is believed that the BAL system allows more flexibility
while the ALBS system allows more full engagement. In this case, engagement refers to
the manner in which members of the public participate in the election, interface with and
understand the ballot, and cast their votes. In the BAL system, residents can consider the
contenders as a group and vote for their preferred candidates without the constraints of
the seat-related ballot structure. The ALBS system would limit this choice to the
candidates who file for a particular seat. Additionally, the BAL system’s consideration
of all candidates collectively allows residents to bullet-vote and lend stronger support for
their favorite contender. While academic research regarding bullet voting is limited, it
has been identified as a common political strategy in Santa Clara contests prior to the
adoption of the ALBS system. (Gillmor, 2013) The ALBS system offers more robust
engagement by allowing residents to cast a vote for each opening without the fear of
dilution among multiple candidates. Since the contest for each opening is considered
independently, residents can cast votes in each contest without the concern of being
overpowered by those who bullet-vote. As such, the ALBS system may allow fuller
participation and foster less fall-off between the total votes cast by the electorate and
those tendered in municipal races. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Gillmor, 2013; Shanks,
2012)
The actual ballot layouts also provide a different interface for the voter, which can
in turn influence overall municipal turnout. In the BAL system, candidates are lumped
into one contest, with the participant allowed to cast votes equal to the number of
openings. Some contend this is an easier voting process, allowing participants to choose
their favorites at once, without being subjected to a number of different ballot questions.
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However, critics of the BAL process argue that confusion regarding the number of votes
able to be cast or fatigue when comparing candidates from a long list of contenders may
cause greater fall-off. The ballot for the ALBS system has an individual contest listing
the candidates for each seat up for election. Participants are allowed one vote for each
race rather than consolidating all of the contests together. Some contend that this stepby-step process and ability to compare candidates by seat avoids confusion and voter falloff. However, critics of the ALBS system may argue that the task of considering
multiple seats instead of one combined contest will lead to even greater fatigue. (CSC,
2011; Shanks, 2012) In practice, it is likely that the system with a more clear match-up
between contenders will enable greater voter decisiveness and therefore higher turnout.
The goal of greater participation is one with practical value. In Unequal
Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, Lijphart indicates that one of the
necessary elements of representative democracy is citizen participation to create
responsiveness among elected officials. (p. 1) It follows that the greater the participation
among voters, the higher the levels of representation, responsiveness and accountability
from government officials. This concept is a core element of the ALBS/BAL
comparison. If voters feel the need to bullet-vote in the BAL system, they effectively
decrease their level of participation. Similarly, if they suffer increased confusion or
fatigue from either the ALBS or BAL system, this is a barrier to their ability to be fully
engaged. On an international basis a number of factors have been seen to influence
participation through voter turnout. These include compulsory voting, modified
registration laws, less frequent elections and weekend election days. (Lijphart, 1997, p. 2)
Additionally the lack of easily accessible information such as party affiliation have
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caused local “down ballot” non-partisan races have struggled regarding voter turnout
parity with partisan races at the top of the ballot. (Wright, 2008, pp. 13, 14) Although the
bulk of the relevant rules in California are outlined in the Elections Code and are static,
the election type does determine the basic ballot layout which can in turn influence voter
participation. While the relative clarity of the BAL and ALBS ballot types can be
debated, it is probable that the more accessible and straightforward ballot will lead to
more robust participation.
Candidate Engagement: It is believed that the BAL and ALBS systems differ
regarding candidate engagement. In this case, candidate engagement refers to the manner
and structure through which potential candidates choose to seek office, or not, in
municipal contests. It is likely that the process which is more appealing will engage a
higher number of candidates to file nomination papers to seek election. In general, it is
thought that the BAL system is the easier in which to file to seek office, while the ALBS
system allows greater strategic flexibility regarding the field of contenders. With only
one candidate filing option and all contests considered collectively, the BAL system is
the more simple of the two. This may be beneficial to candidates who are confused or
intimidated by the process of seeking office. Additionally, some candidates may be more
comfortable standing for election among a group and shy away from the inherent
contentious nature of running for a seat directly against an opponent. However, the
ALBS system allows candidates to file for an individual seat to either run against or
avoid facing an incumbent or other challenger. Contenders may in general be more
strategic and are provided the flexibility to seek office without facing a political ally or
someone who shares the same social or ethnic constituency. In this, the ALBS process
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may permit multiple candidates from emerging minority communities to seek election
simultaneously without marginalizing or “splitting” a shared support base as might be
seen in the BAL system. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012)
It should be noted that the structure of an elections process can have an influence
on the success of the contenders. This, in turn, can affect the willingness of candidates to
file to seek office based on their perceived likelihood of winning. For example, the sheer
number of candidates in a contest has been shown to have an effect on individual success
rates. Congleton and Steunenberg’s study of voter discernment and candidate entry
indicated, “Generally, the probability of success falls as the number of candidates
increases … and expected vote shares diminish.” (1998, p. 298) Some candidates may
wish to seek election with the clarity of an ALBS contest rather than fighting for attention
in a larger group of candidates as seen in the BAL system. This is the case both in open
seats as well as those who choose to challenge an incumbent.
Candidate incumbency plays a large role in the choice of a competitor to seek
elected office, or not. This is seen in the strategic entry of candidates either avoiding a
race against an incumbent or seeking to face an incumbent in the most tactical manner. It
has been widely shown that incumbents have a higher probability of being elected than
challengers. This has been attributed to greater resources of incumbents to provide
constituent services, access to media coverage and fundraising ability. Additionally,
having already been elected, incumbents have a previous history of appealing and
successful characteristics which represent less perceived risk for voters. (Anderson &
Glomm, 1992, p. 207; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2008, p. 1006) This has a
deterrent effect on challengers choosing to face an incumbent, “… potential challengers,
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knowing that incumbents can derive large direct benefits from resources at their disposal,
will be less inclined to enter the fray – and this will be particularly true of potential
challengers with higher opportunity costs, hence higher quality.” (Cox & Katz, 1996, p.
479) While the bulk of these studies were of US Congressional races, similarities can be
expected in municipal contests. When considering the strategic entry into a local election,
challengers may want either the ability to seek office in an open seat without an
incumbent, or, if the defeat of the incumbent is the goal, the ability to face them in the
most competitive manner. The direct competition by individual seat in the ALBS system
may allow candidates to be more strategic regarding the nature of incumbency in the
elections process.
The basic structure of the ALBS system in Santa Clara and Sunnyvale provides a
greater opportunity for challengers to seek election without facing an incumbent. Both
cities have seven seats on their City Councils, with one seat in Santa Clara held by a
directly elected Mayor, as well as a two-term limit. The combination of term limits and
by-seat elections ensures a rotation of openings without an incumbent for consideration
by quality candidates. In a BAL system the incumbent and open seats are combined into
one contest. It is unlikely that in a municipality without term limits all of the incumbents
would choose not to seek reelection. Even in a term-limited environment, with the
rotation of incumbent and open seats it is expected that one or more sitting council
members would seek reelection in each cycle. As such, it is unlikely in the BAL system
that a challenger would have the option to stand for election without an incumbent
sharing the same ballot.
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In cases where challenging an incumbent is the goal, the ALBS structure also
plays a role. In non-partisan elections, much of the benefit or power of incumbency
relates to name recognition among voters. Similarly, because incumbents, former
incumbents or previously unsuccessful candidates already possess some name
identification, they start with an electoral base on which to build. (Lieski, 1989, p. 168)
Ensley, de Marchi and Munger go on to clarify, “… in complex electoral settings,
incumbents should have an advantage. The more complex the setting, the greater is the
extent of this advantage.” (2007, p. 234) The inherent structural differences in the ALBS
system provide a more direct and less complex relationship between challenger and
incumbent. Additionally, the prospect of a direct, head-to-head contest against a strong
competitor may have an influence on the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election, or not.
In their study of the incumbency advantage, Engstrom and Monroe indicated, “… the
reason for withdrawal was likely the anticipation of a rough campaign” (2006, p. 4) of
seated US House Members’ choices to voluntarily not seek reelection. While the
dynamics are different in a term-limited local environment, the more direct challenging
of an incumbent in the ALBS system may also play a role in their consideration to seek a
second term.

CASE STUDIES: Santa Clara, Sunnyvale and BAL Benchmarks
Due to these factors, the BAL and ALBS systems have different influences on the
conflict inherent to the democratic political process. In theory, the BAL system provides
the platform for a more civil election cycle and less collegial policy process. At the same
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time, the ALBS system may foster a more contentious election cycle and more
collaborative policy process. (CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012)
While the differences between the BAL and ALBS systems may seem nuanced,
the reliance of democracy on fair and impartial elections provides them weight in the
study of local government. The questions raised by these differences are at the nexus
between the political and public administration realms, with the public, politicians and
administrators all as stakeholders. This leaves the consideration of the ALBS system at
an interesting point. While the academic body of knowledge regarding government is
significant, the study of local elections is limited and research regarding the rare ALBS
process almost nonexistent.
To determine if there are quantifiable differences in voter and candidate
engagement between the ALBS and BAL systems, appropriate benchmark cities and
sources of data are necessary. While BAL cities are plentiful, ALBS cities are not nearly
as common. There was scant information on the Secretary of State or Fair Political
Practices Commission websites regarding the elections systems found in municipalities.
However, a 2006 report for the City of Sunnyvale surveyed the 20 largest counties in the
state to identify ALBS cities. The research indicated that only Santa Clara and
Sunnyvale use the unique election system. (CSV, 2006) To confirm this information, an
email was sent to the City Clerks distribution list operated by the League of California
Cities requesting the identification of other ALBS municipalities. Of the 697 City Clerk
professionals on the distribution list, only the Cities of Santa Clara, Sunnyvale and Chula
Vista were identified as using the ALBS system. (Okabe, 2012; Norris, 2012) However,
the City of Chula Vista requires a majority for victory, with an initial primary election in

18

the spring and a runoff if necessary. This was not comparable to the ALBS system found
in Santa Clara and Sunnyvale, which use a plurality process and a November election
cycle.
Due to this limited use of the ALBS system, the sample size of any statistical
analysis will be relatively small. However, the City of Santa Clara and City of Sunnyvale
are often regarded as exceptional models of government and are a compelling basis for
research. The City of Santa Clara has received the Helen Putnam Grand Prize award for
its Vote Ethics good government and community engagement programs. (CSC, 2012c)
The City of Sunnyvale was recognized for its performance-based budget practices in
Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government in 1993. (pp. 138 – 165) Both
municipalities are financially stable with a high standard of living and are generally
recognized as well-run cities. They have also effectively used the ALBS system for
approximately 80 years, combined. The entrepreneurial nature of their city governments,
as well as the presence of comparable elections and census statistics allow them to be an
appealing foundation on which to base research comparing the ALBS and BAL systems.
As benchmarks for the even year presidential and gubernatorial election cycles,
the City of Santa Clara as an ALBS example was compared to the Cities of Milpitas and
Mountain View, which use BAL systems. As benchmarks for the odd-year uniform
district election “UDEL” cycles, the City of Sunnyvale was compared to the Cities of
Cupertino and Palo Alto. To be clear, the inclusion of the word “district” in the UDEL
title refers to the overall agency, such as a city or school district, rather than a subset or
district within that jurisdiction. Data from a ten-year period, including the election cycles
of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 for the even-year cycle, and 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007
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and 2009 for the odd-year cycle was compiled into a database. It should be noted that the
City of Palo Alto recently changed to a presidential cycle, with 2009 being their final
odd-year election for comparison.
Numerous variables contribute to voter turnout. For example, individuals with
greater resources, such as wealth and knowledge, tend to vote at a higher rate than those
without. (Tenn, 2005, p. 280, 281; Matsusaka, 1995, p. 112) It should follow that the
more affluent, educated and engaged communities will have higher rates of participation.
An assessment of these factors in the benchmark cities will provide a basis for
understanding if the ALBS or BAL systems influence elections, or if the outcomes are
driven by demographics. While a more complex regression analysis would be necessary
to determine the true statistical influence of these characteristics, they can be used
anecdotally at face value. Trends should in general be consistent with those seen in
census and voter registration data, with higher income, education and voter registration
levels yielding greater voter and candidate engagement.
To the extent possible, care was taken to ensure that the benchmark cities and
available data were comparable. Geographically, they share contiguous borders in the
South Bay and Peninsula regions of Santa Clara County. They also contract with the
Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters (SCCROV) as a regional elections office,
assuring that data and reports would be derived and presented in a consistent format.
Demographic information was available from the 2010 census completed by the US
Census Bureau and voter registration data was provided by the SCCROV for the 2010
time fame as well. (US Census Bureau, 2012a – f; SCCROV, 2010) It should be noted
that the statistics regarding the portion of the population which was registered to vote
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used those 18 and over as a base, but did not eliminate those precluded from voting due
to citizenship or other requirements. Additionally, the data regarding those with a college
degree was a universe of those 25 or older (Percival, 2013) and wealth was measured perhousehold.
College Graduate

variance of $7,400, or an 8.7%

Median Household
Income

household income, showing a

Election Type

City

are fairly similar regarding

Election Cycle

Table 1: 2010 Median Income and Education

The even-year cycle cities

Santa Clara

Even

ALBS

$85,294

48.8%

Milpitas

Even

BAL

$92,694

39.4%

highest earners. However, college

Mountain View

Even

BAL

$88,244

58.7%

graduation rates differ by a larger

Sunnyvale

Odd

ALBS

$90,174

56.1%

Cupertino

Odd

BAL

$120,201

74.4%

Palo Alto

Odd

BAL

$120,670

79.3%

increase between the lowest and

rate of 19.3%. Odd-year cycle cities
again have a larger disparity in both

areas, with a more than $30,000 income variance, or a 33.8% increase between the lowest
and highest earners and a
% Registered to
Vote

Voter
Registration

Election Type

18+ Population

Election Cycle

City

Table 2: 2010 Census and Voter Registration

Santa Clara

Even

ALBS

93,073

46,908

50.4%

Milpitas

Even

BAL

51,495

25,773

50.0%

Mountain View

Even

BAL

59,475

32,549

54.7%

Sunnyvale

Odd

ALBS

108,703

54,705

50.3%

Cupertino

Odd

BAL

42,211

26,826

63.7%

Palo Alto

Odd

BAL

49,333

36,917

74.8%

college graduate rate delta of
23.2%.
With only a 4.7%
variance, the even-year
election cycle cities are fairly
clustered regarding the portion
of the population which were
registered to vote. However,
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the disparity is much larger with the odd-year cycle cities, ranging from 50.3% to 74.8%,
for a 24.5% variance.
Voter Engagement: It is believed that the BAL system allows voters greater
flexibility to choose their preferred candidates regardless of seat designation, as well as
the ability to bullet-vote. However, the ALBS system has a more direct ballot layout and
an ability to cast votes for each opening without diluting support among competing
candidates. It has been acknowledged that the highest voter turnout in the United States
is seen in national elections during a presidential election cycle. State, local and other
races farther down the ballot have “considerably lower turnout.” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 5) An
assessment of even-year presidential and gubernatorial election cycles comparing voter
fall-off between overall turnout and that specific to city council races in benchmark cities
will help determine which system fosters more voter engagement at a municipal level.
As a basis for considering municipal voter engagement in the ALBS and BAL
systems, voter fall-off was determined for local contests. A ten year, five election cycle
period from 2002 – 2010 was used as the data set. The total votes cast in city council
races were divided by the number of seats being considered to determine the average
municipal voter turnout. The total votes cast in the city was then divided by the number
of registered voters to determine the overall turnout, including contests at the top of the
ticket. The municipal turnout was then subtracted from overall turnout to determine voter
fall-off for local contests.
The City of Santa Clara was the ALBS example and the Cities of Milpitas and
Mountain View were the BAL examples. It should be noted that since odd-year election
cycles focus primarily on municipal and school district contests, they normally do not
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include an up-ballot race on which to judge fall-off. As such, the benchmark cities for
the assessment of voter engagement will be limited to those in the even-year presidential
and gubernatorial cycle cities.

Election Cycle
2002 Voter Fall-Off
2004 Voter Fall-Off
2006 Voter Fall-Off
2008 Voter Fall-Off
2010 Voter Fall-Off
Avg, Voter Fall-Off

Table 3: Voter Fall-Off
City of Santa Clara
City of Milpitas
(ALBS)
(BAL)
9.86%
11.19%
15.55%
15.82%
9.66%
9.28%
21.62%
27.44%
14.54%
15.63%
14.25%
15.87%

Table 4: Overall Average
Voter Fall-Off
BAL Avg. Fall-Off:
ALBS Avg. Fall-Off:
Total

City of Mountain View
(BAL)
15.09%
25.04%
16.40%
37.23%
26.64%
24.08%

19.98%
14.25%
5.73%

Less Voter Fall-Off in
ALBS System

The data show a voter fall-off rate of 14.25% for Santa Clara, the ALBS city. The
fall-off rates for the BAL cities were 15.87% and 24.08%, for Milpitas and Mountain
View, respectively. In total, there was greater voter engagement in the ALBS system,
with an average of 5.73% less fall-off.
Hypothesis testing of the question, “Is there a significant difference in voter dropoff rates between ALBS and BAL elections?” was also completed using a two-proportion
Z test and a significance level of 1%. The analysis yielded results where Z was equal to
20.741 and the p-value was 8.09 x 10-96. This allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis
and the conclusion that the difference in voter turnout is in fact statistically significant
and cannot be explained by random chance. (Rahim, 2013b)
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Comparing this to US Census and voter registration data can provide an anecdotal
sense of whether these results mirror income, education and voter registration trends.
The City of Santa Clara had the least voter fall-off at 14.25% while the City of Mountain
View had the highest at 24.08% (see Diagram 3). Income, education and voter
registration levels were not consistent with these trends. While Santa Clara had a 9.9%
higher level of voter engagement, Mountain View was 3.5% more wealthy than Santa
Clara with an average household income of $88,244 compared to $85,294, respectively
(see Diagram 4). Santa Clara also had a lower level of college graduates at 48.8%
compared to Mountain View at 58.7% (see Diagram 5). And, the City of Mountain View
had a higher level of voter registration at 54.7% compared to 50.4% in Santa Clara (see
Diagram 6). While it would be expected that the more affluent, educated and registered
population would have greater participation and less voter fall-off, this was not the case
when comparing the benchmark cities.

Diagram 3

Diagram 4
$94,000

25%

24%
$92,000

$92,694

20%

$90,000
15%

16%

$88,000

$88,244

14%
$86,000

10%

$84,000

$85,294

5%

$82,000

0%

Average Voter Fall-Off
Santa Clara

Milpitas

Mountain View

$80,000

Median Household Incom e
Santa Clara

Milpitas

Mountain View
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Diagram 5
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If in fact participation is influenced by the type of elections process, projected
outcomes from changing from one system to the other can be estimated using past
elections data. In this, the total municipal turnout for each election cycle is multiplied by
the 5.73% difference in voter participation from Table 4. This yields the projected
increase, or reduction, in voter participation for each election, which is then totaled to
derive how many more or fewer votes would be received during a ten year period if the
city changed from one system to the other. The overall total is then divided by the
number of election cycles to estimate the average increase, or decrease in voter
participation per election. The exercise indicated that the City of Santa Clara could
expect an average 2631 vote drop per election in municipal turnout if it changed from an
ALBS to a BAL system. Similarly, if Milpitas and Mountain View changed from a BAL
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to an ALBS system, they could expect an average increase of 1432 votes and 1978 votes
per cycle, respectively.

Table 5: Potential Change in Fall-Off if
Santa Clara Used BAL System
City of Santa Clara
2002 Less Voter Turnout
2004 Less Voter Turnout
2006 Less Voter Turnout
2008 Less Voter Turnout
2010 Less Voter Turnout
Fewer Voters Over 10 Years
Average Per Election Cycle

Table 6: Potential Change in
Fall-Off if Milpitas Used ALBS
System

City of Milpitas
2002 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2004 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2006 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2008 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2010 Adtl. Voter Turnout
Additional Voters Over 10
Years
Average Per Election Cycle

# of potential votes
2406
2898
2499
2668
2687
13157
2631

Table 7: Potential Change in FallOff if Mountain View Used ALBS
System
# of
potential
votes
1262
1565
1377
1479
1476
7159
1432

City of Mountain View
2002 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2004 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2006 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2008 Adtl. Voter Turnout
2010 Adtl. Voter Turnout

# of
potential
votes
1943
2308
1829
1944
1864

Additional Voters Over 10 Years
Average Per Election Cycle

9888
1978

Candidate Engagement: Candidate engagement in an elections system can
influence the number of contenders from which voters have the opportunity to choose
their representatives. It is believed that the simplicity of the BAL system during the
filing and nomination process may be more approachable for candidates. With all
openings considered collectively, there is only one potential filing option from which to
choose. However, the flexibility of numerous contests to seek election found in the
ALBS process and the ability to run while choosing not to face an ally or incumbent may
also be appealing.
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An assessment of the number of candidates who file to run, per open seat, should
help to identify if either the ALBS or BAL process has an effect on candidate
engagement. In this case, all six benchmark cities were used, with the even-year cycle
cities from 2002 – 2010 and the odd-year cycle cities from 2001 – 2009. To do so, the
number of contenders who sought election during that timeframe were summed to derive
the total candidates for each municipality. At the same time, the number of seats that
were considered during that timeframe were also summed to derive the total seats for
each city. The total number of candidates for each election was divided by the number of
seats being considered to determine the average candidates per seat. The average
number of candidates per seat for the ALBS system was then compared to that for the
BAL system benchmarks to determine which fosters more candidates.
Table 8: Even-Year Cycle, 2002 - 2010
City of Milpitas
City of Santa Clara (ALBS)
(BAL)
Total Seats
14
Total Seats
10
Total Candidates
37
Total Candidates
29
Average Candidates Per Seat
2.64
2.90

City of Sunnyvale (ALBS)
Total Seats
Total Candidates
Average Candidates Per
Seat

Table 9: Odd-Year Cycle, 2001 - 2009
City of Cupertino
(BAL)
17
Total Seats
13
36
Total Candidates
29
2.12

City of Mountain View
(BAL)
Total Seats
Total Candidates

City of Palo Alto
(BAL)
Total Seats
Total Candidates

18
41
2.28

23
63

2.23

2.74

Table 10: Candidate Engagement
Overall Average
BAL Candidates Per Seat
2.54
ALBS Candidates Per Seat
2.38
More candidates per opening in
Total
0.16 6.58% a BAL system
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The data indicate that an average of 6.58% more candidates per opening file to
run for city council in BAL elections than in ALBS contests. This is the equivalent of an
additional .16 of a candidate filing to run for each seat the BAL system. Of course, a
partial candidate cannot file to run for city council and the actual number of additional
candidates in a given city or election would vary depending on the number of seats on the
ballot.
Hypothesis testing of the question, “Is there a significant difference in candidates
per seat between BAL and ALBS elections?” was also completed using a two-proportion
Z test and a significance level of 1%. The analysis yielded results where Z was equal to
0.393 and the p-value was 0.346. This precluded the rejection of the null hypothesis and
concluded that the difference in the number of candidates was not statistically significant
and could be explained by random chance. (Rahim, 2013a) While a statistical relation
was not precluded it was also not proven, and the results of the research should be
considered anecdotal.
Regardless of the status of the data as statistically significant or not, additional
information can be gleaned by comparing the outcomes in the benchmark cities with
demographic trends. It would be expected that the municipalities with higher income,
education and voter registration levels would also have a greater candidate engagement.
For the benchmarks elections during the even-year cycle, the correlation between income,
education and voter registration was inconsistent. The City of Milpitas had the highest
number of candidates at 2.9 per seat while the City of Mountain View had the fewest
candidates at 2.28 per seat (see Diagram 7). Milpitas was 5% more wealthy than
Mountain View, with an average household income of $92,694 compared to $88,244,
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respectively, which is consistent with demographic trends (see Diagram 8). However,
education levels did not follow this pattern, with the lowest level of college graduation
found in Milpitas at 39.4% compared to the highest level in Mountain View at 58.7%
(see Diagram 9). Additionally, Milpitas had the lowest level of voter registration at
50.0% while the City of Mountain View had the highest level of voter registration at
54.7% (see Diagram 10).
For the benchmark elections during the odd-year cycle, the correlation between
income, education and voter registration was more consistent. The City of Palo Alto had
the highest number of candidates at 2.74 per seat while the City of Sunnyvale had the
fewest candidates at 2.12 per seat (see Diagram 7). Income, education and voter
registration levels followed this trend. Perhaps most significant, Palo Alto was 34%
more affluent than Sunnyvale, with average household incomes of $120,670 and $90,174,
respectively (see Diagram 8). The highest level of college graduation was also found in
Palo Alto at 79.3% compared to the lowest level in Sunnyvale at 56.1% (see Diagram 9).
This trend continued regarding voter registration, which was 74.8% in Palo Alto with
50.3% found in Sunnyvale (see Diagram 10).
Diagram 7
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Diagram 8
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If the number of candidates who seek election is in fact influenced by the type of
elections process, estimated results from changing the system can be projected in relation
to the number of seats that were up for consideration during the timeframe. In this, the
total seats for each election cycle is multiplied by the .16 additional candidates per seat
ratio from Table 10. This yields the projected increase or decrease in the number of
candidates in both a raw and percentage form for each election. Those numbers are then
totaled to derive how many fewer or more candidates would have run during a ten year
period if the city changed from one system to the other. The overall total is then divided
by the number of election cycles to estimate the average increase, or decrease in
candidate engagement per cycle. It is important to note that applying the .16 additional
candidate ratio per seat rather than the 6.58% average from Table 10 enables the creation
of data both in the change in candidate and as a percentage for each individual
municipality.

Even-Year Election Cycle
Potential Change if Santa Clara Used BAL System
# of
Adtl.
City of Santa Clara (ALBS)
Candidates
Seats
Ratio
Cand.
0.32
2002 Election Cycle
6.00
2.00 0.16
0.64
2004 Election Cycle
12.00
4.00 0.16
0.32
2006 Election Cycle
5.00
2.00 0.16
0.64
2008 Election Cycle
10.00
4.00 0.16
0.32
2010 Election Cycle
4.00
2.00 0.16
Additional Cand. Over 10 yrs.
2.24
Additional Cand. Per Cycle
0.45

%
Change
5.33%
5.33%
6.40%
6.40%
8.00%
6.05%
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Potential Change if Milpitas Used ALBS System
City of Milpitas (BAL)
2002 Election Cycle
2004 Election Cycle
2006 Election Cycle
2008 Election Cycle
2010 Election Cycle
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs.
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle

Candidates
6.00
5.00
6.00
4.00
8.00

# of Seats
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

Ratio
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16

Adtl. Cand.
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
1.60
0.32

Potential Change if Mountain View Used ALBS System
# of
Seats
City of Mountain View (BAL)
Candidates
Ratio Adtl. Cand.
0.64
2002 Election Cycle
13.00
4.00
0.16
0.64
2004 Election Cycle
6.00
4.00
0.16
0.48
2006 Election Cycle
8.00
3.00
0.16
0.64
2008 Election Cycle
8.00
4.00
0.16
0.48
2010 Election Cycle
6.00
3.00
0.16
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs.
2.88
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle
0.58

%
Change
5.33%
6.40%
5.33%
8.00%
4.00%
5.52%

%
Change
4.92%
10.67%
6.00%
8.00%
8.00%
7.02%

Odd-Year Election Cycle
Potential Change if Sunnyvale Used BAL System
# of
Adtl.
City of Sunnyvale (ALBS)
Candidates
Seats
Ratio
Cand.
0.48
2001 Election Cycle
7.00
3.00 0.16
0.64
2003 Election Cycle
9.00
4.00 0.16
0.48
2005 Election Cycle
7.00
3.00 0.16
0.64
2007 Election Cycle
7.00
4.00 0.16
0.48
2009 Election Cycle
6.00
3.00 0.16
Additional Cand. Over 10 yrs.
2.72
Additional Cand. Per Cycle
0.54

%
Change
6.86%
7.11%
6.86%
9.14%
8.00%
7.56%

Potential Change if Cupertino Used ALBS System
City of Cupertion (BAL)
2001 Election Cycle
2003 Election Cycle
2005 Election Cycle
2007 Election Cycle
2009 Election Cycle
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs.
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle

Candidates
6.00
4.00
6.00
6.00
7.00

# of Seats
3.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
3.00

Ratio
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16

Adtl. Cand.
0.48
0.32
0.48
0.32
0.48
2.08
0.42

%
Change
8.00%
8.00%
8.00%
5.33%
6.86%
7.17%
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Potential Change if Palo Alto Used ALBS System
City of Palo Alto (BAL)
2001 Election Cycle
2003 Election Cycle
2005 Election Cycle
2007 Election Cycle
2009 Election Cycle
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs.
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle

Candidates
14.00
11.00
12.00
12.00
14.00

# of Seats
5.00
4.00
5.00
4.00
5.00

Ratio
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16

Adtl. Cand.
0.80
0.64
0.80
0.64
0.80
3.68
0.74

%
Change
5.71%
5.82%
6.67%
5.33%
5.71%
5.84%

The data indicate that as a tangible effect, the BAL system would yield one
additional candidate for voters to consider every two to four election cycles, or a 5.52% –
7.56% larger pool of candidates. This offered an additional 1.6 – 3.68 candidates per
benchmark city over a ten year period, or .32 – .74 candidates per election cycle.

Analysis
Research has indicated a statistically significant difference in voter turnout with
5.73% higher participation of the overall electorate in the ALBS system. Additionally, a
nominal difference of 6.58% in the number of candidates in the BAL system was seen,
though this was not statistically significant and could be explained on the basis of random
chance. As such, more weight should be given to the findings of increased voter
participation in the ALBS system than the increased candidate participation in the BAL
process.
Overall, there was an inconsistent correlation between the level of income,
education or voter registration regarding either voter participation or candidate
engagement. With these key demographic trends showing a disconnect or irregular
relation to the voter and candidate data in the benchmark cities, it is likely that outside
factors such as the elections process influenced the results.
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The implementation of the ALBS and BAL benchmark elections was the
responsibility of the Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters. Former Assistant Registrar
of Voters Elaine Larson retired in 2012 with 22 years of experience as an elections
professional. In an interview, Ms. Larson indicated that, based on the disconnect
between voter and candidate participation rates, and the income, education and voter
registration levels of the benchmarks, it is likely that the election system had an
influence. A long ballot as sometimes found in the BAL system can intimidate or fatigue
people to the point that some do not use all of their entitled votes or skip contests
completely. Additionally, sometimes people don’t read how many votes they can cast in
the BAL system, and don’t realize they can vote for more than one candidate. Further,
Ms. Larson indicated that the ALBS ballot layout is more clear and less complex than the
BAL system. If people are prompted to vote in each contest as seen in the ALBS
process, they are more likely to do so. The lack of bullet-voting in the ALBS system
likely caused larger turnout as well. While there was a less significant effect on
candidate engagement, it was felt that in general the ALBS system was more strategic
and the BAL process more simple. For candidates with political savvy, the by-seat
process allowed more flexibility to run without going against an ally or an incumbent,
unless so desired. However, the lack of seat designations in the BAL system eliminates
one of the choices necessary to run for council so may be more approachable for those
who are not as experienced. Overall, Ms. Larson shared that the significant increase in
voter turnout seemed more valuable to the elections process than the small increase in the
number of potential candidates. A larger portion of the electorate was involved in the
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democratic process of choosing their representatives, and through this had a say in the
future of their city. (Larson, 2013)
However, the assessment of benchmark trends should not be limited to their
relation to US Census and voter registration data. There are a number of academic and
anecdotal dynamics that should also be considered regarding the implications and
consequences of the ALBS and BAL elections processes.
While traditional political literature has determined causality between negative
campaigning and lower voter turnout, more recent studies have indicated that American
voters are more resilient. One possibility is that the nature of civility or incivility in the
debate may have more impact than the overall presence of negative campaigning.
(Brooks, 2006, pp. 693, 694) To the extent that the more direct debate in the ALBS
system is focused on issues rather than personal attacks, the information and attention
garnered from the discussion may yield higher turnout.
Major factors in determining community participation are access to information
and the expected “legislative profits” from an election. In this, higher engagement is
expected in relation to the perceived importance of the election, or the legislative profits
of the contest. (Settle & Abrams, 1976, pp. 81, 82, 87, 88) For example, increased turnout
has been found in states which tax or spend at a higher rate, providing voters with a
greater economic stake in the outcome of the election. (Percival, Currin-Percival, Bowler
& van der Kolk, 2007, pp. 137, 138) Participation is also influenced by the personal
exposure to and the desire to assimilate political information. (Tolbert, McNeal & Smith,
2003, p. 27) However, demonstrating the vital role that municipalities play in government
and the accompanying legislative profits can be difficult. The lack of attention paid to
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local affairs by media outlets may hinder the public’s ability to garner much of this
information. (Lieski, 1989, p. 153, 154) Gerston indicates, “It is in that no man’s land of
politics that local elected officials in California operate … their accomplishments … are
often buried deep in local newspapers or mentioned almost as afterthoughts on television
news, if at all.” (2012, p. 139) To the extent the ALBS or BAL system offers a more open
or transparent process of governance, they may allow the public and media to more
readily determine the legislative profits therein. Should the profits be compelling, this
may in turn drive greater participation in local government.
The more direct competition seen in the ALBS system may also provide greater
clarity for voter decisions and therefore cause higher turnout. Matsusaka noted that
people are more likely to vote if they have a clear understanding of who is the best
candidate. (1995, p. 112) Levine and Palfrey have also indicated a sharp decline in
turnout as the “cost,” or effort required to assess candidates and vote increases. (2007, p.
155) The ease by which people determine the best candidate decreases the cost of
participating in the process and increases turnout. It may be that both the more critical
nature of the ALBS system as well as the individual by-seat contests allow voters to more
readily discern which candidates best reflect their own ideologies. With candidates
separated into smaller groups for individual seat contests, the ALBS system offers a more
manageable number of contenders to compare rather than the collective field in the BAL
process. And, the debate in the ALBS system for each seat being directed between fewer
candidates may provide more focused information for the voter to use in determining
which is their desired representative.
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In Nonvoting and the Decisiveness of Electoral Outcomes, Abramson, Diskin and
Felsenthal discussed variations on the Downsian “voting paradox” in which residents
who feel their individual vote will not affect the outcome of an election are less likely to
participate. This in turn empowers those who choose to vote and favors their desired
outcomes. (pp. 500, 501, 510) It appears that the higher rate of voter turnout and
engagement in the ALBS system either fosters or has been fostered by the empowerment
of a broader portion of the community. An alternative point of view could be that
residents who choose to bullet-vote in the BAL system are allowed greater influence for
their specific favored candidate, which is also a form of empowerment. However, it
should be noted that there is a risk in the BAL system of multiple candidates from
minority or underrepresented segments of the community splitting votes from a discrete
support base. In this case, bullet-voting in the BAL system may be detrimental to the
success of multiple minority candidates while the separate seats in the ALBS system may
provide a structure allowing fuller engagement of these communities.
While the structure of contests in the ALBS system was created to foster greater
incumbent accountability, the nature of higher turnout may in itself have an effect.
Wright has indicated that “… the non-partisan ballot drives down participation and yields
an even greater electoral advantage for incumbents.” (Wright, 2008, p. 14) While local
races in California are obligated by law to be non-partisan, the higher voter turnout and
engagement in the ALBS system may foster its own form of incumbent accountability.
Additionally, the two systems differ regarding the ability for a sitting council
member to run unopposed. It is unlikely that incumbents will garner no challengers in
the BAL system. With multiple seats on the ballot collectively, it is probable that at least
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one challenger will file, which means all of the candidates will be opposed. One point of
view is that this is desirable, and that all incumbents should be required to run against
competitors for re-election to share their political ideologies and be judged by the public.
Another point of view is that the potential for a high-performing council member to run
unopposed may lead them to be more responsive to community needs in pursuit of that
goal. In the ALBS system it is more likely that a well-prepared incumbent in an
individual seat will run unopposed. Challengers may choose instead to file in either an
open seat or one with a weak incumbent. The decrease in fundraising necessary for
unopposed incumbents may lessen the influence of money in that particular seat as well
as provide more time for the council member to focus on the process of governance.

Conclusion
The question remains, what does this information mean for residents, elections
officials and local governments? Proponents of the ALBS system will contend the 5.73%
overall increase in the voter turnout yielding 7,159 – 13,157 participants for benchmark
cities during a ten year timeframe is significant. However, those who favor the BAL
system may contend that the 5.52% – 7.56% increase in the candidate pool yielding 1.6 –
3.68 more candidates over a ten year period is also of benefit. As much of this
assessment is relative to the needs of the individual community and the environment in
which the elections systems operate, either may be a viable alternative depending on the
circumstances.
However, the gains seen in voter and community engagement in the ALBS
system are difficult to overlook. Putnam has indicated that, “It is sometimes hard to tell
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whether voting causes community engagement or vice-versa, although some recent
evidence suggest that the act of voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms of
good citizenship. So it is hardly a small matter for American democracy when voting
rates decline … .” (2000, p. 35) Given this, it is likely that the considerable increase in
voter engagement in the ALBS system will produce greater public benefit than the
nominally larger number of candidates in the BAL system. This is augmented by the
statistical significance of the voter engagement data, while the results of the candidate
engagement data could be explained by random chance.
As a foundation for democracy, the structure of a local election system should
not be taken lightly or influenced by the potential for political gain. In considering which
system would be of most benefit to a municipality, it is important to focus on the actual
needs of the community. Those unsuccessful in an established system may seek change
in an effort to increase their political chances. At the same time, incumbents may be
hesitant to change due to their familiarity and success in the current process as well as
uncertainty regarding alternate systems. (Bowler, Donovan and Karp, 2006, p. 435)
Neither is the correct impetus for adhering to or changing an election system. The
process which best fits the culture and needs of each unique community should be that
which is favored, regardless of challenger or incumbent status.
Policy makers and voters should also be cautious that change for the sake of
change, or to suit political motivations, may yield unforeseen or unintended outcomes.
The results may be different but not necessarily better. An example is seen in Losing
Fewer Votes, where it was shown that changing to new elections technology is usually
accompanied by a decline in voter turnout, due primarily to unfamiliarity with the process
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and a failure to cast votes properly. (Hanmer, Park, Traugott, Niemi, Hernson, Bederson
& Conrad, 2010, pp. 129, 139) It is likely that a change from the BAL to the ALBS
system, or vice versa, would cause similar voter confusion and an initial drop in turnout.
The extent to which this decrease is sustained would depend on how engrained past
practice is in the community, how intuitive the new ballot type is found to be and how
aggressively voter education is pursued to explain the new system.
Certainly, this research is not exhaustive and is meant as a starting point for the
academic discussion of the ALBS system. Future study of incumbency success rates,
ballot statement costs, funding levels of political campaigns, or measurements of political
and governmental performance would be pertinent as well. Efforts as simple as
extending the existing 10-year data set to a longer time frame would further test the
current findings. A further step of using a more robust regression analysis to statistically
determine the influence of demographic and census data on the outcomes would also lend
additional credibility. And, looking outside of California to states such as Washington,
which uses variations of the ALBS process as its main elections system may yield
additional benchmarks for study. (Katsuyama, 2013; Meinig, 2013) With the limited
body of academic knowledge regarding the ALBS system, there are numerous additional
foci of study that could yield valuable information.
However, it is hoped this will lend itself toward a tangible body of knowledge. It
has recently been lamented that on a state level in California, “Reform is an idle concept
left to the whimsical who fail to understand the intractable political cement otherwise
known as the status quo.” (Gerston, 2012, p. 199) On a local level, policy makers have
fewer institutional constraints and a greater opportunity to enact change. Should the need
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present itself in a local municipality, the ALBS system has shown itself to be at least one
more viable option for elections reform.
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Appendix A
List of Diagrams:
Diagram 1: BAL System
Diagram 2: ALBS System
Diagram 3: Average Voter Fall-Off (Voter Engagement)
Diagram 4: Median Household Income (Voter Engagement)
Diagram 5: College Graduates (Voter Engagement)
Diagram 6: Registered to Vote (Voter Engagement)
Diagram 7: Avg. Candidates Per Seat (Candidate Engagement)
Diagram 8: Median Household Income (Candidate Engagement)
Diagram 9: College Graduates (Candidate Engagement)
Diagram 10: Registered to Vote (Candidate Engagement)

List of Tables:
Table 1: 2010 Median Income and Education
Table 2: 2010 Census and Registration
Table 3: Voter Fall-Off
Table 4: Overall Average Fall-Off
Table 5: Potential Change in Fall-Off if Santa Clara Used BAL System
Table 6: Potential Change in Fall-Off if Milpitas Used ALBS System
Table 7: Potential Change in Fall-Off if Mountain View Used ALBS System
Table 8: Even-Year Cycle, 2002 – 2010
Table 9: Odd-Year Cycle, 2001 – 2009
Table 10: Candidate Engagement
Table 11: Potential Change in # of Candidates if Santa Clara Used BAL System
Table 12: Potential Change in # of Candidates if Milpitas Used ALBS System
Table 13: Potential Change in # of Candidates if Mountain View Used ALBS System
Table 14: Potential Change in # of Candidates if Sunnyvale Used BAL System
Table 15: Potential Change in # of Candidates if Cupertino Used ALBS System
Table 16: Potential Change in # of Candidates if Palo Alto Used ALBS System

List of Data Sources for Voter Engagement
and Candidate Engagement Tables:
City of Cupertino. (2001). Resolution No. 01-245: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Cupertino Receiving the Declaration of Election Results for the General
Municipal Election Held on November 6, 2001. City of Cupertino: City Clerk’s Office.
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City of Cupertino. (2003). Resolution No. 03-219: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Cupertino Receiving the Declaration of Election Results for the General
Municipal Election Held on November 4, 2003. City of Cupertino: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Cupertino. (2005). Resolution No. 05-206: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Cupertino Receiving the Declaration of Election Results for the General
Municipal Election Held on November 8, 2005. City of Cupertino: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Cupertino. (2007). Resolution No. 07-194: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Cupertino Receiving the Declaration of Election Results for the General
Municipal Election Held on November 6, 2007. City of Cupertino: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Cupertino. (2009). Resolution No. 09-195: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Cupertino Receiving the Declaration of Election Results for the General
Municipal Election Held on November 3, 2009. City of Cupertino: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Milpitas. (2002). Resolution No. 7244: Resolution of the City Council of the City
of Milpitas Confirming Canvass of Returns and Declaring Results of General Municipal
Election on November 5, 2002, Pursuant to Elections Code 10262 and 15400. City of
Milpitas: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Milpitas. (2004). Resolution No. 7486: Resolution of the City Council of the City
of Milpitas Confirming Canvass of Returns and Declaring Results of General Municipal
Election on November 2, 2004, Pursuant to Elections Code 10262 and 15400. City of
Milpitas: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Milpitas. (2006). Resolution No. 7639: Resolution of the City Council of the City
of Milpitas Confirming Canvass of Returns and Declaring Results of General Municipal
Election on November 2, 2006, Pursuant to Elections Code 10262. City of Milpitas: City
Clerk’s Office.
City of Milpitas. (2008). Resolution No. 7802: Resolution of the City Council of the City
of Milpitas Confirming Canvass of Returns and Declaring Results of General Municipal
Election on November 4, 2008, Pursuant to Elections Code 10262. City of Milpitas: City
Clerk’s Office.
City of Milpitas. (2010). Resolution No. 8049: Resolution of the City Council of the City
of Milpitas Confirming Canvass of Returns and Declaring Results of General Municipal
Election on November 2, 2010, Pursuant to Elections Code 10262. City of Milpitas: City
Clerk’s Office.
City of Mountain View. (2002). Certification of Official Election Returns – November
5, 2002 General Municipal Election. City of Mountain View: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Mountain View. (2004). Certification of Official Election Returns – November
2, 2004 General Municipal Election. City of Mountain View: City Clerk’s Office.
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City of Mountain View. (2006). Certification of Official Election Returns – November
7, 2006 General Municipal Election. City of Mountain View: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Mountain View. (2008). Certification of Official Election Returns – November
4, 2008 General Municipal Election. City of Mountain View: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Mountain View. (2010). Certification of Official Election Returns – November
2, 2010 General Municipal Election. City of Mountain View: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Santa Clara. (2002). Certification of the Result of the Canvass of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 5, 2002. City of Santa Clara: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Santa Clara. (2004). Certification of the Result of the Canvass of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 2, 2004. City of Santa Clara: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Santa Clara. (2006). Certification of the Result of the Canvass of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 7, 2006. City of Santa Clara: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Santa Clara. (2008). Adoption of a Resolution Reciting the Final Results of the
General Municipal Election Held on November 4, 2008. City of Santa Clara: City
Clerk’s Office.
City of Santa Clara. (2010). Adoption of a Resolution Reciting the Final Results of the
General Municipal Election Held on November 2, 2010. City of Santa Clara: City
Clerk’s Office.
City of Sunnyvale. (2003). Resolution No. 160-3: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Sunnyvale Declaring Canvass of Returns and Results of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 2, 2003. City of Sunnyvale: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Sunnyvale. (2005). Resolution No. 197-05: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Sunnyvale Declaring Canvass of Returns and Results of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 8, 2005. City of Sunnyvale: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Sunnyvale. (2008). Resolution No. 308-08: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Sunnyvale Declaring Canvass of Returns and Results of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 6, 2007. City of Sunnyvale: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Sunnyvale. (2009). Resolution No. 412-10: A Resolution of the City Council of
the City of Sunnyvale Declaring Canvass of Returns and Results of the General
Municipal Election Held on November 3, 2009. City of Sunnyvale: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Palo Alto. (2001). Resolution of the Council of the City of Palo Alto Declaring
the Results of the Consolidated General Municipal Election Held on Tuesday, November
6, 2001. City of Palo Alto: City Clerk’s Office.
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City of Palo Alto. (2003). Resolution of the Council of the City of Palo Alto Declaring
the Results of the Consolidated General Municipal Election Held on Tuesday, November
2, 2003. City of Palo Alto: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Palo Alto. (2005). Resolution of the Council of the City of Palo Alto Declaring
the Results of the Consolidated General Municipal Election Held on Tuesday, November
5, 2008. City of Palo Alto: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Palo Alto. (2007). Resolution of the Council of the City of Palo Alto Declaring
the Results of the Consolidated General and Special Municipal Elections Held on
Tuesday, November 6, 2007. City of Palo Alto: City Clerk’s Office.
City of Palo Alto. (2009). Resolution of the Council of the City of Palo Alto Declaring
the Results of the Consolidated General and Special Municipal Elections Held on
Tuesday, November 3, 2009. City of Palo Alto: City Clerk’s Office.
Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters. (2001). Santa Clara County Statement of Votes
Consolidated Election, City of Sunnyvale Council Seats 1, 2, & 3. Santa Clara County:
Registrar of Voters.
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